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SUMMARY
Among creative professionals, affective vulnerability and diagnosed mood disorders
are higher than would be expected in the general population (Ludwig, 1995). Rumination,
that is, a broad class of thoughts that recur regardless of context or task and are centered
around a common theme or idea (Martin & Tesser, 1996) may act as a third variable in
the relationship between creativity and depression (Trani, submitted; Verhaeghen et al.,
2014; Verhaeghen et al., 2005; Verhaeghen et al., 2017). Recently I proposed a model in
which adaptive and maladaptive ruminations differentially influence creativity and mood
(Trani, submitted). Essentially, rumination, maladaptive or otherwise, enhances associative
processing by sustaining the activation of concepts within memory. Adaptive rumination
supports creative associative processing by allowing concepts in memory to remain active
despite being unrelated to present tasks or environments. In much the same way, maladap-
tive rumination works to sustain depressive symptoms across environments by sustaining
activation of negative affect and related concepts in memory which would impair a person’s
ability to distract themselves from negative moods. I tested the hypothesized relation-
ships between creativity, rumination, and depression using structural equation modeling.
Roughly 450 participants completed an online battery of creativity, rumination, person-





Known as the ”mad-genius” hypothesis, there is a long-standing societal belief that people
with mental illness or experiencing psychological suffering are more creative (for a review,
see Becker, 2014). There is evidence supporting a relationship between depressive dis-
orders and creativity (Akinola & Mendes, 2008; Hershman, 1998; Jamison, 1995; Kyaga
et al., 2011; Post, 1996). Historiometric reviews reveal higher suicide rates and a higher
rate of diagnosis for depressive disorders among eminent creative professionals when com-
pared to population base rates and/or eminent professionals in other domains (Andreassen,
1987; C. Cox, 1926; Ellis, 1904; Goodwin & Jamison, 1990; Jamison, 1993; Kyaga et al.,
2013; Ludwig, 1995, 1998; Post, 1994; Ramey & Weisberg, 2004; Simonton, 2014; Weis-
berg, 1994; Windsor-Shellard, 2017). In a review performed by Jamison (1993), depressive
disorders among creative professionals were eight to ten times more likely than in the gen-
eral population (Jamison, 1993). There are, however, a number of different psychological
explanations for the connection.
One possible causal mechanism could be the alteration and disruption of cognitive pro-
cesses that often occurs over the course of mood disorders (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010;
Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Simons et al., 1984; Weingartner et al., 1981). In some cases,
these cognitive changes caused by psychopathology may support creative processing, up to
a certain degree of psychopathological severity (Abraham, 2014b; Beaussart et al., 2014).
For example, at mild levels, the euphoria and increased energy characteristic of hypomanic
episodes may provide a boost to creative performance (American Psychiatric Association,
2013; Andreasen, 2008) and thus prove useful for creative professionals. As psychopathol-
ogy becomes more severe, as often seen during manic episodes, cognitive processing is
likely impaired beyond the ability to produce creative works and creative performance suf-
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fers (Abraham, 2014a). This may explain why the siblings and children of people with
bipolar are more creative than the general population (Kyaga et al., 2013; Kyaga et al.,
2011; Simeonova et al., 2005).
The relationship between major depression and creativity, however, does not appear to
take the shape of an inverted u-shaped curve. For example, even mild to moderate levels of
depression negatively affect productivity (Rost et al., 2004), implying a negative linear rela-
tionship between dysphoria and creative production. Additionally, people are increasingly
likely to engage in thought suppression as levels of dysphoria increases (Beevers et al.,
1999). Creative abilities suffer as self-reported thought suppression increases (Verhaeghen
et al., 2017).
Another, potentially more plausible mechanism driving the relationship between dys-
phoria and creativity is that a third variable may be at play – specifically, self-focused
rumination (Verhaeghen et al., 2005; Verhaeghen et al., 2017). Rumination describes a
class of thoughts consisting of chronic, passive, and persistent dwelling on an idea or topic
occurring without direct environmental demand (Martin & Tesser, 1996; van Randenborgh
et al., 2010). Self-focused rumination is a category of ruminative thought where the central
idea or topic is the self (Verhaeghen et al., 2017).
The content of ruminative thoughts can be additionally categorized as adaptive or mal-
adaptive. Adaptive ruminations increase psychological resilience (e.g., reduction in the
frequency and severity of dysphoric mood) and may arguably improve cognitive processes
like creativity (i.e., increasing the frequency and quality of creative ideas and activities). In
contrast, maladaptive ruminations reduce psychological resilience and may impair cogni-
tive processes – especially those related to problem solving and creativity.
The present study proposes a third-variable model to test the relationship between ru-
mination, creativity, and mood disorder. Specifically, I seek answers for the following
questions:
• Is there a direct, causal relationship between creativity and dysphoria?
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• When acting as a third variable, do maladaptive ruminations and adaptive rumina-
tions play differential roles in the relationship between creativity and dysphoria?
To answer these questions more precisely, we need to consider the nature of creativity,
dysphoria, and rumination in more detail.
1.1 Creativity and Dysphoria
Creativity is commonly defined as the generation of ideas and solutions that are novel,
useful, and of high quality (Amabile, 1983; Hennessey & Amabile, 2009; Runco, 2014;
Sternberg, 2005). The stages involved in generating a creative idea or product are referred
to as the creative process. Despite differing conceptualizations, almost all models of the
creative process contain an initial preparation phase that leads to incubation and insight, fol-
lowed by a verification stage and eventual implementation (Amabile, 1983, 2013; Basadur
et al., 2012; Beaussart et al., 2014; da Costaa et al., 2015; Hogarth, 1980; Wallas, 1926).
The creative process is briefly described below.
1.1.1 The Creative Process
Creativity, at its broadest, is a type of problem solving in response to the appearance of
problems that cannot be solved in an immediately obvious way. When a person identifies a
creative problem space, relevant knowledge retrieval and accumulation begins in an effort
to both fully define the problem and identify potential solutions – a phase widely referred
to as a preparation phase. While knowledge accumulates, periods of intense work and incu-
bation (i.e., relative rest) are often interspersed. During incubation, associations still form
between concepts related to the problem and concepts cued from a concurrent environment
or task. Although some of these associations may be conscious, many of these associations
occur outside of conscious awareness, leading to insight – that is, a feeling that a novel
answer has been found from seemingly nowhere (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984). Because
not all new ideas are necessarily good ideas, a verification stage tests the usefulness of all
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new ideas and products as solutions to the original problem. If the verification stage proves
successful, then the creative solution will be implemented and the creative process ends.
If, however, the verification stage proves unsuccessful, then the creative process may be
forced to either restart or end in failure – the determinant in this case is often motivation to
continue.
1.1.2 Convergent and Divergent Thinking
Two cognitive processes identified as crucial for creative success are convergent and di-
vergent thinking (Acar & Runco, 2012; Guilford, 1950, 1967, 1986; Kenett et al., 2014).
These processes are differentially activated in response to specific types of problems. Di-
vergent thinking, often elicited during open-ended problem solving (Abraham, 2014a), oc-
curs when a gamut of appropriate ideas are generated around a single starting point (Batey
& Furnham, 2008; Guilford, 1967). In contrast, convergent thinking occurs when thoughts
synthesize to find a single correct answer to a problem (Arden et al., 2010; Claridge & Mc-
Donald, 2009; Guilford, 1950). Convergent thinking problems result in novel answers less
frequently than divergent thinking problems (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Kaufman & Baer,
2005; Mumford et al., 1998; Mumford et al., 2008). Despite this, convergent thinking re-
mains an important process – especially during the evaluation of the appropriateness of a
novel solution (Jones et al., 2011; Lee & Therriault, 2013). Both divergent and convergent
thinking are reliable indicators of individual creativity when used in combination (Baer,
2011; Dietrich, 2007; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Han, 2003; Runco, 1991, 2008; Ward et al.,
1999).
Divergent thinking is thought to consist of four subfactors: fluency, flexibility, original-
ity, and elaboration (Guilford, 1950; Runco, 2008; Torrance, 1965, 1969). Fluency is oper-
ationalized as the total number of creative responses a person can generate; it is believed to
reflect the ease with which people produce new ideas. The more ideas a person generates,
the greater the chances that ideas will be both novel and useful (Ansburg, 2000). Flexibility
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is operationalized as the number of different categories of creative answers a person gen-
erates; it is thought to represent a person’s ability to switch across different types of ideas.
Generating a large number of responses across multiple cognitive categories increases the
chances that a person will generate a creative response. Originality reflects how unique
responses are. Elaboration reflects the amount and quality of additional details provided in
each response. Assessment of the latter two aspects tends to involve the ratings of judges
or experts (Amabile, 1983).
1.1.3 The Role of Depressive Disorders
Depressive disorders, the most common psychopathology in the United States (Substance
Abuse & Mental Health Services Administration, 2017), exist in two distinct forms: major
(unipolar) depression and bipolar depression. Roughly 7.1% of Americans will be diag-
nosed with major depression (National Institute of Mental Health, 2019) and 4.4% will
be diagnosed with bipolar disorder (National Institute of Mental Health, 2017) at some
point during their lives. Both major depression and bipolar disorder consist of episodes of
persistently low affect, anhedonia, and other symptoms (e.g., disturbed sleep, feelings of
guilt and inadequacy, and suicidal preoccupations) lasting for two-weeks or longer (Ad-
mon & Pizzagalli, 2015; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Bipolar depression is
distinguished from major depression by the presence of manic episodes – that is, periods
of intensely elevated and expansive mood lasting for at least one week (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2013). Depressive episodes are more severe and longer in duration
when left untreated (Melartin et al., 2004; Rosenberg & Kosslyn, 2014). In spite of this,
many creative professionals avoid treatment for these disorders fearing reduced creative
performance as a result of a more balanced mood (Jakovljević, 2013; Kyaga et al., 2011).
There are multiple reasons to doubt the hypothesis that depression results in improved
creative performance. First, people are significantly less productive during a depressive
episode when compared to their own productivity during healthy states or that of healthy
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peers (Adler et al., 2006; Druss et al., 2001; Stewart et al., 2003). Second, positive affect
is associated with improved creative performance when compared with negative or neutral
mood states (Amabile et al., 2005; Fredrickson, 2009; Isen & Reeve, 2005). Third, asso-
ciative processing is the foundation upon which creativity is built (Martindale, 1995), but,
depression correlates with abnormal activity in the medial prefrontal cortex which can lead
to over-inhibition of the medial temporal lobe, thus constraining activation of associative
networks (Bar, 2009). Fourth, dysphoric and depressed people tend to have lower cognitive
flexibility than controls (Ruiz & Odriozola-González, 2016) whereas highly creative peo-
ple tend to be more cognitively flexible (Dreu et al., 2011). Fifth, problem-solving ability
is negatively associated with psychopathology (Aldao et al., 2010).
In some cases, however, negative affect has been found to enhance creative processing
(Akinola & Mendes, 2008; De Dreu et al., 2008; Kaufman & Baer, 2002). Negative affec-
tive states increase the number of solutions generated during creative tasks requiring diver-
gent thinking, analogical problem solving, and precise attention to detail (Abele-Brehm,
1992; Akinola & Mendes, 2008; Jausovec, 1989; Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997). One possi-
ble explanation is that negative affect may serve as a motivational signal that a project has
not yet met one’s creative standards, thus pushing one to work harder (De Dreu et al., 2008;
George & Zhou, 2002; Martin et al., 1993). Additional evidence for this claim comes from
the finding that people receiving negative social feedback tend to be more creative than peo-
ple receiving nonsocial feedback or positive social feedback (Akinola & Mendes, 2008).
Moreover, individuals with the greatest affective vulnerability benefit most from receiving
negative social feedback (Akinola & Mendes, 2008).
1.2 Rumination as a third variable
The way people respond to their mood states changes the duration of these states and the
frequency the mood will occur again in the future (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Specific at-
tempts to change the magnitude or the type of affective state a person experiences are
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referred to broadly as emotional regulation strategies (Aldao et al., 2010). Rumination is a
popular emotional regulation strategy hypothesized to manage emotions and cognitions as-
sociated with unexpected (i.e., faster or slower) rates of goal progression (Martin & Tesser,
1996). Specifically, rumination is a class of thoughts consisting of chronic, passive, and
persistent dwelling on an idea or topic occurring in the absence of direct environmental
demand (Martin & Tesser, 1996; van Randenborgh et al., 2010). People who focus pas-
sively on their current negative mood tend to be less psychologically resilient than people
who engage in more active reflection with the intent of problem solving (Burwell & Shirk,
2007).
Negative affect may trigger introspective rumination (Costa et al., 2018) and detail-
oriented thinking (Bodenhausen et al., 2000) allowing task-unrelated thoughts to influence
cognitive processing without interference (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006), increasing the
chances of novel association formation (Trani, submitted). Habitual ruminators may be
more willing to engage in the type of detail-oriented introspection necessary to produce
meaningful creative works (Verhaeghen et al., 2014; Verhaeghen et al., 2005; Verhaeghen
et al., 2017). At the same time, people who are more likley to ruminate are also more
susceptible to the development of mood disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
Like most emotional regulation strategies, rumination can be classified as either adap-
tive or maladaptive (Aldao, 2013; Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
Ruminating about perceived failures, losses, mistakes, and unmet goals may leave a person
especially vulnerable to the development of depressive episodes because it prevents people
from engaging in more realistic goals that can increase feelings of competency (van Ran-
denborgh et al., 2010). The content of adaptive self-focused ruminations tends to center
around improving personal understanding of thoughts, feelings, and experiences (Trapnell
& Campbell, 1999). In contrast, the content of maladaptive self-focused ruminations tends
to center around perceived threats, losses, and injustices to the self (Trapnell & Campbell,
1999). Along with content, the impact ruminations have on affect and cognition can help
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to determines the adaptiveness of ruminations (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Ciesla & Roberts,
2007). Thus, rumination may begin as adaptive and, by the end of a period of rumination,
shift to more maladaptive processing, or vice versa. Some evidence suggests that the in-
tention to ruminate –that is, whether rumination is initiated deliberately or spontaneously
– may influence the extent to which ruminations are adaptive. Spontaneous self-initiated
ruminations often lead to more negative affect than more deliberate reflections (Ciesla &
Roberts, 2007; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003). I will explore the nature
of maladaptive and adaptive ruminations in detail in the following sections.
1.2.1 Maladaptive Rumination
Maladaptive ruminations decrease positive affect and/or psychological resiliency, are not
likely to help problem solving, and are often reported as unwanted by the people expe-
riencing them (McIntosh & Martin, 1992; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987). Maladaptive ruminations are strongly and positively correlated with
neuroticism and depression (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Historically, rumination has
been studied in relation to mood disorders, emphasizing rumination in response to dys-
phoric mood states (Chen & Li, 2013; Johnson et al., 2014; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Because of this, the majority of rumination research
has focused on maladaptive ruminations, specifically, depressive rumination.
Depressive rumination, a form of maladaptive rumination, is a chronic and passive fix-
ation on the symptoms, causes, and consequences of depressive states and negative affect
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1991, 2000a; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). Engaging in depres-
sive rumination reduces psychological resiliency by increasing the duration and intensity
of negative moods (Abela et al., 2004; Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Ciesla & Roberts, 2007;
S. Cox et al., 2012; Hilt et al., 2012; Jose & Brown, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1991;
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011; Spasojevic & Alloy,
2002). Depressive rumination is more strongly related to depressive symptoms than gen-
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eral forms of self-focused attention are (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Even when controlling
for initial levels of depressive symptoms (Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008), depressive ruminators have longer and more severe depressive episodes than
their non-ruminating peers (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; W. Hong et al., 2010; Just & Alloy,
1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolan-Hoeksema et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000b;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
1994; Schmaling et al., 2002; Spasojević & Alloy, 2001). Brooding is a typical exam-
ple of a maladaptive rumination strategy. It consists of passive comparisons of a person’s
current situation with an unachieved - and often, unachievable - standard (Treynor et al.,
2003). Brooding responses, commonly observed during depressive rumination, reflect a
maladaptive type of moody pondering highly indicative of depressive cognitions (Joor-
mann & Gotlib, 2010; Lo et al., 2008; Matthews & Wells, 2014; Pearson et al., 2010).
People higher in brooding are more likely to engage in other behaviors that reduce psy-
chological resilience including avoidance, suppression, denial, and substance abuse (Aldao
et al., 2010; Burwell & Shirk, 2007).
Why do people engage in maladaptive rumination in the first place? People are more
likely to spend time ruminating if they hold positive beliefs about rumination (Watkins &
Moulds, 2005). Ruminators describe maladaptive rumination as dangerous and uncontrol-
lable (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999). Yet, roughly 80% of people who frequently engage
in maladaptive rumination report at least one perceived benefit from this behavior (Watkins
& Baracaia, 2001), namely that it provides insight into both depression and life problems
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999) This seems to be
particularly the case for people with a history of depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001;
Watkins & Moulds, 2005).
In line with these beliefs, it seems that maladaptive ruminations effectively reduce de-
pressive symptoms at first. This is likely because engaging in self-focused rumination may
prolong an affective state and its associated cognitions long enough for people to gain in-
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sight and understanding – or at least, to feel they do (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). People
who respond to negative affect with adaptive rumination (e.g., reflection) may experience
an immediate worsening of depressive symptoms compared to maladaptive ruminators, but
as time progresses, maladaptive rumination – not adaptive rumination – is positively asso-
ciated with depressive symptoms (Treynor et al., 2003).
1.2.2 Adaptive Rumination
Adaptive ruminations are strongly and positively associated with intelligence and openness
to experience (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Importantly, creativity is also strongly and
positively associated with intelligence and openness to experience (Silvia, 2008). Adaptive
rumination may help people identify specific problem-solving goals (Burwell & Shirk,
2007) which may sustain motivation during the creative process. Additionally, people
higher in adaptive rumination may be more willing to engage in active problem-solving
efforts (Burwell & Shirk, 2007).
Reflective rumination is one often-studied example of adaptive rumination. It consists
of an active attempt to explore, understand, and cope with personal thoughts, emotions, and
experiences (Arditte & Joormann, 2011; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
2008; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003). Reflective rumination does not
carry the same risks for developing psychopathology as other forms of rumination (Trap-
nell & Campbell, 1999). Longitudinal studies have shown that people higher in reflection at
initial assessment measured lower in dysphoria (Treynor et al., 2003) and were more likely
to have recovered from previously diagnosed depression at follow up (Arditte & Joormann,
2011). Because reflection indicates awareness of the interaction between adaptive cop-
ing strategies and emotional experiences, reflection may also be an indicator of emotional
intelligence (Burwell & Shirk, 2007).
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1.2.3 Rumination and Depression
When compared to healthy controls who rely primarily on reflection as an emotion-regulation
strategy, people diagnosed with major depressive disorder are more likely to turn to brood-
ing, a maladaptive form of rumination (Joormann et al., 2006). Brooding consists of pas-
sive comparisons of a person’s current situation with an unachieved and often unacheivable
standard (Treynor et al., 2003). High stress reactivity is linked to depression and low re-
silience to stress (see Southwick et al., 2005, for a review) as well as rumination (Disner et
al., 2011). People with a lower sense of mastery over important life events as well as those
who experience more chronic stress and challenges are more likely to ruminate (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1996). One reason for this is that people with a lower sense of mastery may
feel like they have little control over the things that happen to them and that there is little
they can individually do to control problems once they’ve started (Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
1999). Brooding significantly moderates the relationship between stress and depression (S.
Cox et al., 2012). Interview-rated assessments of depression as well as maternal- and self-
ratings of depression symptoms both concurrently and longitudinally are associated with
brooding in adolescents (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). This may be in part because a higher
tendency to engage in depressive brooding is associated with a lower sense of mastery
and greater feelings of chronic stress and strain (Disner et al., 2011; Treynor et al., 2003),
and high stress reactivity is in itself linked to depression and low resilience to stress (see
Southwick et al., 2005, for a review).
The link between reflection, a more adaptive rumination strategy, and depression is
less clear. For instance, once brooding is accounted for, reflection is unrelated to concur-
rent self-reported depression symptoms and changes in self-reported depression symptoms
over time as well as longitudinal and concurrent maternal-reports of depression symptoms
(Burwell & Shirk, 2007). Additionally, reflection is only moderately related to interview-
rated concurrent depression symptoms (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). The reason may be that
brooding is associated with negative attentional biases while reflection is not (Joormann
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et al., 2006).
Neurological correlates further support an association between rumination and depres-
sion. Both rumination (Kross et al., 2009) and major depressive disorder (Berman et al.,
2011; Greicius et al., 2007; Mayberg et al., 2005) are associated with increased activity and
connectivity within the subgenual cingulate cortex. Important to the present study, changes
in this region associated with rumination stem from maladaptive ruminations rather than
adaptive ruminations (Berman et al., 2011).
1.2.4 Rumination and Creativity
Rumination is not a form of problem solving in that it lacks efforts to change either the con-
tingencies or the consequences of a situation (Aldao et al., 2010; Burwell & Shirk, 2007;
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Despite this, ruminations centered around a goal may support
problem solving by sustaining activation of goal-related concepts in memory (Verhaeghen
et al., 2005).
Rumination may also support creative processing by prolonging an affective experi-
ence. Creativity is supported by both positive (Isen, 2000) and negative affect (Akinola
& Mendes, 2008). The number of solutions generated for creative tasks that require con-
centration, divergent thinking, analogical problem solving and precise execution are higher
for participants in negative rather than positive mood states (Akinola & Mendes, 2008).
During negative mood states, rumination may enhance critical evaluations, introspection,
and careful deliberation of creative work increasing quality (Akinola & Mendes, 2008).
The nature of rumination might come into play here as well. Assuming that rumination
enhances associative processing (Trani, submitted), adaptive rumination should provide
neutral distraction that may simultaneously increase creativity and – through distraction –
reduce dysphoria.
It is, however, very unlikely that maladaptive rumination per se would support creativ-
ity. Maladaptive ruminators are more indecisive, less likely to engage in active problem
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solving after ruminating, and demonstrate reduced problem solving ability when compared
to adaptive ruminators and healthy peers (Aldao et al., 2010; Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Carver
et al., 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980, 1986; R. Y. Hong, 2007). Maladaptive ruminators
struggle to disengage with contexts and goals that are no longer relevant or rewarding
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), possibly stemming from reduced cognitive flexibility (Cohen
& Ferrari, 2010; Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). Failing to
meet a goal increases negative affect which may trigger maladaptive rumination in rumina-
tors, prolonging efforts on potentially unachievable goals (van Randenborgh et al., 2010).
In sum, maladaptive ruminators may be less willing to engage when faced with creative
problems and struggle to disengage from efforts that are unachievable, thus reducing pro-
ductivity.
1.3 Resulting Hypotheses
To test my proposed theory that adaptive and maladaptive rumination differentially impact
the relationship between creativity and dysphoria, I proposed the following hypotheses:
• H1: Rumination is a complex construct representing both maladaptive and adaptive
behaviors and cognitions.
• H2: People higher in adaptive rumination will measure higher in creativity and lower
in dysphoria.
• H3: People higher in maladaptive rumination will measure higher in dysphoria and
lower in creativity.






Data was collected from 250 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers and 216 students
at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Students were recruited using the virtual participant
pool website, SONA. After signing up, students and AMT workers were provided a link to
access the study. Students received 2 hours of participation credit. Workers were compen-
sated $10 for submitting a survey response. To be eligible for the study, participants were
required to be fluent in English and over the age of 18. AMT workers were additionally
required to have a 97% HIT approval rate. Of the total participants who submitted data,
10 participants (2 students, 8 AMT workers) were eliminated for inappropriate responding.
Thus, the total number of participants included in analyses was 456. Because I did not have
existing hypotheses regarding gender or age, demographic data were not collected.
2.2 Measures
The present study investigates trait rumination, creativity, and dysphoria. The measures
used to define these constructs are described in the following subsections. Please refer to
Appendix A for full measures.
2.2.1 Trait Rumination
When ruminative responses become chronic or habitual, people are classified as trait ru-
minators. Trait rumination measures assume that people who more frequently engage in
previous ruminative behaviors are more likely to engage in future ruminations. Therefore,
measures of trait rumination assess the likelihood that a person will respond with rumi-
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native behaviors to future problems. All assumptions about the adaptiveness of the types
of rumination measured by each of the subscales were tested using confirmatory factor
analysis.
Broad Rumination Scale
The Broad Rumination Scale (BRS; Trani & Verhaeghen, forthcoming) assesses rumina-
tion along a range of eight proposed components: brooding, compulsivity, distractibil-
ity, optimism, personal expressiveness, reflectiveness, social expressiveness, and worrying.
Participants are presented with 34 statements and asked to indicate the extent to which they
agree that each statement describes their thoughts and behaviors using a 7-point Likert-
type scale (1-strongly disagree; 7-strongly agree). Responses on items for each subfactor
are summed to provide a total subfactor score.
Brooding represents a person’s tendency to engage in passive, negative cognitions about
the self. Higher scores indicate greater brooding. Questions assessing brooding include:
”Bad things always seem to happen to me”, and ”When something goes wrong, I tend to
think of all the things that have recently gone wrong”.
Compulsivity assesses the degree a person is able to disengage from intrusive thoughts
and events. Higher scores indicate greater preoccupation with intrusive thoughts and events.
Questions assessing compulsivity include: ”When I start to worry, it is very hard for me to
stop”, and ”It is very difficult for me to calm down when I am upset”.
Distractibility assesses the degree a person can maintain focus on a task without in-
trusive thoughts or having attention captured from task-unrelated stimuli – a higher score
indicates a person more prone to distraction. Questions assessing distractibility include:
”When I am emotional, it is hard for me to focus on what I am supposed to be doing”, and
”I find myself daydreaming when I should be paying attention”.
Optimism assess the tendency to engage in passive, positive cognitions about the self.
Higher scores indicate greater positivity. Questions assessing optimism include: ”My
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thoughts about myself are more often positive than negative”, and ”I am capable of over-
coming life’s obstacles”.
Personal expressiveness assesses the extent to which a person engages in hobbies to
express ruminative thoughts. Higher scores indicate a greater tendency toward personal
expression of ruminative thoughts. Questions assessing personal expressiveness include:
”My creative hobbies are a way for me to communicate how I am feeling”, and ”I use my
hobbies as a way of expressing myself”.
Reflectiveness assess a person’s tendency to passively analyze their thoughts and feel-
ings with the goal of greater understanding – higher scores indicate greater reflection.
Questions assessing reflectiveness include: ”It is important for me to understand why I
am feeling a certain way”, and ”I like to analyze my thoughts”.
Social expressiveness assesses the extent that a person engages in social conversation
to express ruminative thoughts with higher scores indicating a greater tendency toward
social rumination. Questions assessing social expressiveness include: ”I tend to vent to my
friends when I am feeling overwhelmed”, and ”It helps me to talk about my problems with
other people”.
Worrying assesses a person’s tendency to ruminate about the future. Questions assess-
ing worrying include: ”Last minute changes in plans are frustrating for me”, and ”Uncer-
tainty about the future bothers me”.
Ruminative Responses Scale
The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) is a mea-
sure of rumination in response to dysphoria. Participants are presented with a 22-item
list of common behaviors that people engage in while feeling sad or depressed. For each
item, participants indicate on a 4-point Likert-type scale how frequently they engage in
each behavior from 1-almost never to 4-almost always. Questions can be split into three
subfactors: depression related symptoms, brooding, and reflection (Treynor et al., 2003).
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Brooding is hypothesized to be a maladaptive process where a person passively focuses
on the symptoms of low affect. Questions assessing brooding include: ”Think ’What am
I doing to deserve this?’”, ”Think ’Why do I have problems other people don’t have?’”,
”Think ’Why can’t I handle things better?’”. In contrast, reflection is hypothesized to be an
adaptive process representing a person’s willingness to evaluate private thoughts and feel-
ings. Questions assessing reflection include: ”Analyze recent events to try to understand
why you are depressed”, ”Write down what you are thinking and analyze it”, ”Analyze
your personality to try to understand why you are depressed”. Scores for each subfactor
are obtained by summing the total value of the relevant responses. Depression related items
were excluded due to their confounding relationship with dysphoria (Treynor et al., 2003).
Responses to Positive Affect Scale
The Responses to Positive Affect Questionnaire (RPA; Feldman et al., 2008) assesses the
extent to which people engage in ruminative processing while experiencing a positive mood
state. Participants are presented with 17 statements and the following instructions: ”People
think and do many different things when they feel happy. Please read each of the following
items and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each one
when you feel happy, excited, or enthused. Please indicate what you generally do, not
what you think you should do”. Participants responded using a 4-point Likert-type scale
(1-almost never; 4-almost always).
Items can be separated into three distinguishable factors: emotion-focus, self-focus,
and dampening. Emotion-focus items measure a person’s tendency to ruminatively fixate
on the experience of positive affect while in a positive mood state. Examples of emotion-
focus items include: ”think about how happy you feel”, ”think about how strong you feel”,
”notice how you feel full of energy”. Self-focus items measure a person’s tendency to
ruminatively fixate on the self while in a positive mood state. Examples of self-focus items
include: ”think about how proud you are of yourself”, ”think ’I am achieving everything’”,
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”think ’I am getting everything done’”. Dampening items measure a person’s tendency
to try and reduce feelings of positive affect while in a positive mood state. Dampening
items include: ”think about things that could go wrong”, ”remind yourself these feelings
won’t last”, ”think ’this is too good to be true’”. A total score is obtained by summing the
relevant item responses for each factor so that higher scores indicate greater expression of
factor-related behaviors.
2.2.2 Creativity
Creativity in the present study is a composite construct consisting of the common vari-
ance between divergent thinking, convergent thinking, creative self-beliefs, and real-world
creative achievement.
Divergent Thinking
The Torrance Test of Creative Thinking - Verbal (TTCT-V; Torrance, 1965) is a measure
of divergent thinking. Participants see a standard image and are asked: ”Just suppose you
could walk on air or fly without being in an airplane or similar vehicle. What problems
might this create?”.
The Purdue Creativity Test (PCT; Lawshe & Harris, 1960) is a measure of divergent
thinking. Each item asks participants to imagine all the possible uses for a figural line
drawing. The present study presents people with 3 different figural line drawings, – that is,
three different Purdue test items.
Participants have three minutes to answer each of the four divergent thinking tests. The




The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1968) assesses convergent thinking by pre-
senting participants with three seemingly unrelated words. Participants are asked to find a
fourth word which would connect all the words together. For example, participants may see
the words ”duck”, ”fold”, and ”dollar”. These words can be connected with a fourth word:
”bill”. The present study uses a 30-item list chosen from the Bowden and Jung-Beeman
(2003) normed set of stimuli. There are 10 items in each difficulty set; easy, medium, and
hard. Items are presented in order from easiest to hardest with an ample five-minute time
limit.
Creative Achievement
The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) assesses real world
creative achievement across ten creative domains: Visual arts, music, dance, architectural
design, creative writing, humor, inventions, scientific inquiry, theater and film, and the
culinary arts. For each of the ten domains, participants mark the statements that describe
their creative achievements. Additionally, participants indicate the number of times they
have received rewards or national recognition for accomplishments in each domain. Points
across each domain are combined for an overall creativity score.
Creative Personality
The Short Scale of Creative Self (SSCS; Karwowski et al., 2018) is composed of 11 per-
sonally descriptive statements measuring creative self-concept. Participants are asked to
rate the extent to which each statement accurately describes their beliefs about creativity
using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1-definitely not to 5-definitely yes. Example items
include: ”My creativity is important for who I am” and ”I trust my creative abilities”. Item
scores are summed to yield a total score.
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2.2.3 Dysphoria
Dysphoria was measured using the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale
Revised (CESDR; Eaton et al., 2004). The CESDR consists of twenty items measuring
depression symptoms including anhedonia, sadness, feelings of worthlessness, and suicidal
ideation. Responses are scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale where participants indicate
the frequency with which they have experienced a described symptom over the past two
weeks from not at all (0 days a week) to nearly every day for 2 weeks. Answers are
summed to form a single score. Example questions include: ”I felt sad”, ”I lost interest in




Data were cleaned and analyzed using Python version 3.8 and R-studio for Windows 10.
Structural equation models (SEM)s were analyzed using EQS 6.4 for Windows 10 (Bentler,
2006). Code and datasets will be posted to a github repo upon successful completion of
this dissertation.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Because measures were administered to two, potentially different populations, it was nec-
essary to check for differences in Cronbach’s alphas between groups. Group Cronbach’s
alphas are reported in Table 3.1 – the two populations are adequately similar.
Table 3.1: Group Cronbach’s Alphas
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Consequently, all descriptive statistics and all subsequent analyses were run on the com-
bined dataset. Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for all tested variables
are reported in Table 3.2. Of interest for further data analysis, the RRS-reflection and RRS-
brooding subscales are correlated at r= .53, p¡0.01. This correlation is surprisingly high
for two scales posited to represent opposing factors – that is, a maladaptive and an adap-
tive factor that represent different underlying cognitive thought processes – so it is very
likely that, when compared to other measures, the RRS is primarily capturing maladaptive
rumination.
3.2 Rumination Measurement Model
As an additional check to ensure that the rumination scales were behaving as expected,
I tested each scale using robust confirmatory factor analysis in EQS version 6.4 on Win-
dows 10. Expected scale structure was confirmed for each subscale. Interested readers are
directed to Appendix C for detailed results from these analyses.
Please note that I have standardized the presentation of structural equation models. Ob-
served variables are represented as rectangular boxes while latent variables are represented
as ovals. Causal relationships are indicated as directional arrows with independent vari-
ables pointing to dependent variables. Correlational relationships are indicated as curved,
bi-directional arrows. Statistically non-significant relationships are indicated in red. Any
paths constrained to one (to anchor the latent factor to its presumed most representative
measurement) are indicated as dashed lines. Please note that for each independent variable,
at least one path must be set to one for model functionality. The beta-weight for this path
is still calculated in the overall model. Finally, path and error values are not reported for
models other than the final models.
Model fit for structural equation models and confirmatory factor analyses were deter-
mined based on the criteria set forth in Byrne (2008). The chi square statistic remains one
of the most commonly reported indicators of fit in SEM as it tests the extent to which data
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Table 3.2: Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations
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from a predicted model and observed data are equal. Ideally, the null hypothesis should not
be rejected as predicted models should match observed data. In the present dissertation, the
Satorra-Bentler scaled statistic was used as the chi square statistic which is corrected for
non-normality commonly present in large samples (Byrne, 2008). Generally speaking, re-
searchers tend to divide the total chi square statistic by the degrees of freedom with values
less than 5 indicating acceptable fit.
Because the chi square statistic is one of the least reliable indicators of fit in large
samples, additional indicators of fit are provided and used to evaluate fit. The comparative
fit index (CFI) ranges in value from 0.00 to 1.00 and compares the hypothesized model
to the independence model – that is, the model fit that would be obtained if all variables
in the model were mutually uncorrelated. As a benchmark, CFI values above 0.90 are
acceptable (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) with values higher than 0.95 indicating ideal fit
(Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the consistent version of the AIC (CAIC) are
also reported. These fit statistics take into account the parsimony of the model – that is,
these estimates take into account the number of estimated parameters in the calculation of
goodness of fit. In accounting for parsimony, these metrics can indicate how well models
will cross validate in future samples (Byrne, 2008). As an added benefit, these indices can
be used to test model fit between two different and non-nested models. Although an ideal
benchmark for these measures has not been established, smaller values indicate a better
fitting model.
Perhaps the most informative criterion in covariance model fit testing, the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA) indicates the extent that the proposed model, with
optimally chosen parameter values, would fit the population covariance matrix if it were
available (Byrne, 2008). As a benchmark, values less than 0.10 are considered acceptable
model fit with ideal model fit obtained at values less than 0.08. RMSEA has the added
benefit of providing statisticians with a confidence interval – that is, it allows us to estimate
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with 90% confidence that the true RMSEA value in the population will fall within the
provided confidence interval bounds. Generally, tighter confidence interval bounds are
seen as further indication of model fit and precision (Byrne, 2008).
For the present study, I did not combine all subscales from all scales purported to mea-
sure rumination into a single score, as is often done. Instead, I grouped subscales based on
their assumed adaptiveness and tested the veracity of this model using confirmatory factor
analysis. Those subscales that were not clearly adaptive or maladaptive in nature were al-
lowed to crossload on both adaptive and maladaptive rumination factors. See Table 3.3 for
information about how subscales were assigned to rumination adaptivity factors.
Table 3.3: Subscale assignment to rumination adaptivitiy factors
In this measurement model, the adaptive and maladaptive rumination factors were al-
lowed to correlate. Model fit statistics for the initially proposed structure were less than
ideal – that is, chi square was significant, RMSEA was above 0.10, and CFI was below
0.90. Additionally, several relationships were statistically non-significant (see Figure Fig-
ure 3.1 for more detailed information).
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Figure 3.1: Measurement model of initially proposed rumination adaptivity factors.
The Legrange Multiplier test for adding parameters suggested an improvement of fit if
the BRS-optimism and RRS-reflection subscales were allowed to crossload on both adap-
tive and maladaptive factors. Employing these suggestions and removing non-significant
paths did improve model fit from the initial model – that is, chi square gained a degree
of freedom and decreased by 253.74 points, CFI increased from 0.71 to 0.83, RMSEA
decreased from 0.15 to 0.12, AIC decreased from 563.26 to 307.52, and CAIC decreased
from 261.03 to 0.18! Unfortunately, model fit remained below the acceptance criterion
detailed above (see Figure Figure 3.2 for tested model and fit statistics).
3.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis on Rumination
I employed exploratory factor analysis to get a better understanding of the actual underlying
structure of the rumination measures. Using the psych package in R to test for a two-factor
principal components analysis with oblimin rotation, eigenvalues and the resulting scree
plot shown in Figure Figure 3.3 support a three-factor solution. Because the second and
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Figure 3.2: Respecified Measurement Model of initially proposed rumination factors
third factors are difficult to interpret and not clearly different from each other in a three-
factor solution, a two factor solution was favored. Results from the three-factor solution
are shown in Appendix B.
In agreement with my originally proposed rumination structure, there was a clear mal-
adaptive factor composed of eight items; it explained 63% of the relative variance (Factor
1; 32% of the total variance). Additionally, there was a clear adaptive rumination factor
composed of six items; it explained 37% of the relative variance (Factor 2; 19% of the total
variance). Factor loadings are shown in Table 3.4.
Unlike my proposed measurement model of rumination, only two of the rumination
subscales cross-loaded onto both the maladaptive and adaptive factors: BRS-optimism and
RRS-Reflection. Instead of cross-loading as hypothesized, however, the BRS-compulsivity
and BRS-distractibility subscales best captured maladaptive rumination while the RPA-
emotion-focus, BRS-personal-expressiveness, and BRS-social-expressiveness loaded ex-
clusively on adaptive rumination. As predicted, the BRS-brooding, RRS-brooding, BRS-
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Figure 3.3: Scree plot for two-factor solutions using exploratory factor analysis on the
rumination measures
worrying, and RPA-Dampening factors best captured maladaptive rumination while the
BRS-reflection, BRS-optimism, and RPA-self-focus loaded exclusively on adaptive rumi-
nation.
3.4 Full structural equation model
I first fit a full, non-directional model using all creativity, rumination, and mood variables,
setting up the structure of the rumination variables as derived from the exploratory factor
analysis reported above. In this non-directional model, dysphoria, adaptive rumination,
maladaptive rumination, and creativity were allowed to correlated freely with each other.
The results are shown in Figure Figure 3.4. Model fit was acceptable, but neither of the
creative ability measures (i.e., the factor for divergent thinking and the single measure
of convergent thinking) loaded significantly on the latent creativity factor. To potentially
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Table 3.4: Factor loadings for two-factor solution using exploratory factor analysis on the
rumination measures
remedy this problem, I decided to exclude convergent thinking, measured by the RAT,
from the model. There is evidence that the presence of a convergent thinking construct
may moderate the relationship between divergent thinking and creativity (Zhu et al., 2019).
Considering the potentially complex moderation effect that comes with the inclusion of
convergent thinking, I decided to exclude the RAT from future models. There is a precedent
for excluding convergent thinking in favor of divergent thinking in creativity research (Lee
et al., 2014; Richardson, 1986).
Removing the RAT, I retested the model. The following paths were not statistically
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Figure 3.4: Non-directional model in literature with EFA-based measurement model
significant and the model was re-tested with these paths removed: the correlation between
creativity and maladaptive rumination, the correlation between maladaptive rumination and
adaptive rumination, and the correlation between creativity and dysphoria. Because model
fit statistics remained poor based on the fit criterion established above and further changes
did not make sense from a theoretical perspective, path weights are not reported and this
model structure was rejected.
I then tested a directional model structure with the EFA-based rumination measurement
model shown in Figure Figure 3.6. In this model, the adaptive and maladaptive rumination
factors were allowed to correlate. Both creativity and dysphoria were endogenous variables
predicted by maladaptive and adaptive rumination.
The following paths were not statistically significant and the model was re-tested with
these paths removed: the correlation between creativity and maladaptive rumination and
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Figure 3.5: Full, directional model including all variables with EFA-based measurement
model of rumination
the correlation between maladaptive rumination and adaptive rumination. Results from this
simplified model are reported in Figure Figure 3.7. Because model fit statistics remained
beneath the acceptable threshold for model fit detailed earlier and further changes did not
make sense from a theoretical perspective, path weights are not reported and this model
structure was also rejected.
3.5 Simplifying the Rumination Construct
Because the models above failed to yield satisfactory fit, I decided to simplify the rumi-
nation construct by selecting a single best measure of rumination. Combining theory with
the findings from the EFA, I created unit-weighted z-composites of the maladaptive and
adaptive subscales for each measure of rumination. Subscales expected to cross-load based
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Figure 3.6: Full model on all variables excluding the RAT with EFA-based measurement
model of rumination
on theory were not included in the calculation of the composite. For the RRS, maladap-
tive rumination was defined as a person’s z-score on the brooding subscale while adaptive
rumination was defined as a person’s z-score on the reflection subscale. For the RPA, mal-
adaptive rumination was defined as a person’s z-score on the dampening subscale. Based
on the EFA results for the RPA scale, the adaptive rumination factor was defined as the
unit-weighted composite of a person’s z-scores on both the emotion-focus and self-focus
subscales. For the BRS, maladaptive rumination was defined as the unit-weighted com-
posite of a person’s z-scores on both the worrying and brooding subscale. For the BRS,
adaptive rumination was defined as the unit-weighted composite of a person’s z-scores on
both the optimism and reflectiveness subscales.
Correlations between the maladaptive and adaptive rumination factor for each rumina-
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Figure 3.7: Directional model on all variables excluding the RAT with EFA-based mea-
surement model of rumination
tion scale are reported in Table 3.5. Further supporting my assertion that the RRS is ac-
tually a measure of maladaptive ruminative tendencies, the RRS adaptive scale (i.e., RRS-
reflection) is the only scale of assumed adaptive rumination that positively correlates with
other measures of maladaptive rumination. Because the adaptive nature of the RRS sub-
scales remain unclear and because the subscale does not appear to add clarity to the present
analyses, the RRS will be dropped from the final SEM model.
When comparing the correlations, the BRS maladaptive scales showed the highest pos-
itive correlations with other maladaptive scales and the highest negative correlations with
adaptive scales of rumination (except for the adaptive subscale of the RRS, in which case
the correlation was positive). The adaptive scale of the BRS not only correlated positively
with adaptive scales but also correlated negatively with maladaptive scales of other mea-
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Table 3.5: Correlations between maladaptive and adaptive rumination factors for each ru-
mination scale
sures. The adaptive scale of the RPA correlated positively with all adaptive scales but failed
to significantly correlate with the RRS maladaptive scale making the full nature of the RPA
adaptive scale difficult to interpret. Moreover, the BRS-reflectiveness factor is the only
rumination subscale that does not correlate significantly with my measure of dysphoria
suggesting that the BRS-reflectiveness may represent a pure measure of adaptive rumina-
tion. For these reasons, the BRS emerged as the best scale to represent rumination in the
final SEM model.
3.5.1 BRS Measurement Model
I tested the measurement model for the BRS using the structure suggested by the EFA.
Originally, I had allowed maladaptive and adaptive rumination to correlate, but this path
was removed as it was not statistically significant. The accepted measurement model along
with path weights and model fit is shown in Figure Figure 3.8. To elaborate, CFI fell in
the ideal model fit range with value greater than 0.95. RMSEA also met acceptable model
threshold at 0.06 with a confidence interval ranging between 0.04 and 0.08 indicating that
the population RMSEA value is likely also within my established acceptance criterion.
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Figure 3.8: First test of the proposed model with rumination defined as the BRS
3.6 SEM on Non-directional Full Model with Simplified Rumination Construct
Using the BRS measurement model structure shown in Figure Figure 3.8, I tested my hy-
pothesized model using a full SEM on all proposed factors. In this model, creativity and
dysphoria were allowed to correlate with each other as well as with the adaptive and mal-
adaptive rumination factors. In the first test of the model, neither the path from the creativ-
ity factor to the RAT nor the correlation between creativity and dysphoria were statistically
significant; these paths were removed, and the model was retested.
In the second test of the model, the correlation between dysphoria and adaptive rumi-
nation was not statistically significant; this path was removed and the model was retested.
Model fit improved: chi square Model fit and path weights for the third model can be seen
in Figure Figure 3.9.
3.7 SEM on Proposed Full Model with Simplified Rumination Construct
Using the BRS measurement model structure shown in Figure Figure 3.8, I tested my hy-
potheses using a full SEM on all proposed factors. The path from adaptive rumination to
dysphoria was not statistically significant. The revised model was retested and results are
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Figure 3.9: Final statistics for the non-directional model with simplified rumination con-
struct
shown in Figure Figure 3.10. Model fit was adequate (albeit, less than ideal) and paths
supported my hypotheses. Comparatively, however, the non-directional model shown in
Figure Figure 3.9 maintained better model fit. Thus, the directional model is rejected in
favor of the non-directional model.
In a last effort to find a place for convergent thinking, I added a causal path from adap-
tive rumination (independent variable) to the RAT. Not only was the causal path from adap-
tive rumination to the RAT not statistically significant, but also model fit worsened; thus,
the model was rejected (χ2(99) = 395.28; RMSEA(0.07-0.09) = 0.08; CFI = 0.90; AIC =
197.28; CAIC = -309.85) and further attempts to include the RAT will not be attempted.
To conclude, the model shown in Figure Figure 3.9 is accepted as the final model.
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Figure 3.10: Final statistics for the directional model with simplified rumination construct
3.8 Replicating Model Structure
The model fit for the final model, although adequate, remains less than ideal. Additionally,
the BRS is a novel measure of rumination. Thus, replicating model structure using a more
widely accepted measure of rumination is desirable. Fortunately, the RRS is one of the most
accepted and widely used measures of rumination with over 3400 citations1! Although
the RRS has limitations, as noted earlier in this paper, a replication of the general model
structure – that is, the paths between rumination, creativity, and dysphoria – using the RRS
as the sole metric of rumination would give more credence to the model structure shown in
Figure Figure 3.9
I tested the non-directional model structure using the RRS brooding subscale as the
indicator for maladaptive rumination and the RRS reflection subscale as the indicator for
1According to Google Scholar, retrieved on 4/23/2021
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adaptive rumination in Figure Figure 3.11. In this model, creativity and dysphoria were
allowed to correlate freely both with each other and with the maladaptive and adaptive ru-
mination factors. Additionally, because the RRS subscales are so highly correlated with
each other, a correlation between them was estimated as well. In the first test of this model,
the correlation between creativity and the RRS brooding subscale was not statistically sig-
nificant, nor was the correlation between creativity and dysphoria. The model was tested
a second time with statistically non-significant paths set to zero; this final non-directional
model is represented in Figure Figure 3.11.
Figure 3.11: Final non-directional model with RRS as the sole measure of rumination
I tested the directional model structure using the RRS brooding subscale as the indicator
for maladaptive rumination and the RRS reflective subscale as the indicator for adaptive
rumination in Figure Figure 3.12. Model fit was excellent and the general model structure
confirmed the directional model structure in Figure Figure 3.10. Model fit was slightly
better for the non-directional model than the directional model.
I discuss the overall implications of these findings in the next section.
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My dissertation utilized structural equation modeling to test the relationship between dys-
phoria, creativity, and rumination. Specifically, I wanted to better understand the impact
of both adaptive and maladaptive rumination on creativity and dysphoria. I predicted that
greater tendencies to engage in adaptive rumination would result in greater creativity and
lower dysphoria. In contrast, as the tendency to engage in maladaptive rumination in-
creases, a person’s creativity would suffer as would their psychological resiliency – that is,
increases in maladaptive rumination would be accompanied by increases in dysphoria. In
addition to these hypotheses, I tested two model structures of the underlying relationships
between these constructs. First, a non-directional model in which creativity and dysphoria
were allowed to freely correlate with both the adaptive and maladaptive rumination factors.
Second, a directional model in which creativity and dysphoria were jointly caused by (i.e.,
endogenous variables of) adaptive and maladaptive rumination. I hypothesized that, regard-
less of directionality, the relationship between creativity and adaptive rumination would be
both statistically significant and positive whereas the relationship between creativity and
maladaptive rumination would be negative. I also hypothesized that, regardless of direc-
tionality, the relationship between dysphoria and maladaptive rumination would be both
statistically significant and positive whereas the relationship between dysphoria and adap-
tive rumination would either be negative or not statistically significant. Findings supported
my hypotheses and favored a non-directional model.
4.1 The relationship between creativity and dysphoria
As discussed in the Introduction, a pervasive view in artist communities and among some
creativity researchers is the ”mad-genius” hypothesis which posits that there is a direct and
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potentially beneficial relationship between creativity and dysphoria (see Becker, 2014, for a
review). A goal for the present research was to evaluate the relationship between creativity
and dysphoria – specifically, to determine if creativity and dysphoria are directly linked or
if the relationship between these constructs could be better explained by the presence of a
third-variable, rumination. None of the models or Legrange multiplier tests for adding paths
supported either a direct or a correlational relationship between creativity and dysphoria
when both adaptive and maladaptive rumination factors are present. This finding adds
support to the growing argument that creativity and dysphoria are related only through
the actions of third variables, like rumination (Verhaeghen et al., 2005; Verhaeghen et al.,
2017).
4.2 Measuring rumination
Generally speaking, the majority of studies investigating rumination tend to rely on the
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991, with a reflection
and a brooding subscale) as the sole indicator of a person’s tendency to ruminate. The
present research sought to extend the number of indicators of rumination by including
subscales from two other rumination scales: the Broad Rumination Scale (BRS; Trani &
Verhaeghen, forthcoming) and the Responses to Positive Affect questionnaire (RPA; Feld-
man et al., 2008). Additionally, I argued that the subscales of these rumination measures
could be categorized as a form of adaptive and/or maladaptive rumination. My proposed
measurement model of rumination was not supported and the suggestions for added paths
via the Legrange Multiplier test could not be justified using established theory.
Because I did not have additional apriori predictions about the structure of rumination,
I turned to exploratory factor analysis for further guidance. My hypothesis that rumina-
tion could be categorized as either adaptive or maladaptive in nature was supported by
the finding of a two-factor solution with correlated factors that could be arguably inter-
preted as adaptative and maladaptive rumination. Furthermore, only two subscales - the
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BRS optimism and RRS reflection subscales – could be categorized as both adaptive and
maladaptive in nature (i.e., these subscales crossloaded onto both factors).
Considering the design of the RRS, it is not surprising that the reflection subscale would
not be measuring purely adaptive rumination. Specifically, the intercorrelation between the
RRS brooding and reflection subscales was quite high (r = .53) for subscales thought to
measure different aspects of rumination. Additionally, items on the RRS have been shown
to be relatively confounded with symptoms of dysphoria (Treynor et al., 2003); indeed,
both subscales maintained moderate, positive correlations with dysphoria in the present
study and the RRS reflection subscale crossloaded on both the maladaptive and adaptive
factors in both the two- and three-factor EFA documented here.
That the BRS optimism subscale represents aspects of both adaptive and maladaptive
rumination (but with loadings of opposite sign) is intriguing. It is possible that the BRS
optimism subscale reflects an adaptive tendency toward psychological resilience – that is,
a person’s natural ability to cognitively return to a baseline set point after experiencing
difficulties or setbacks. It is also possible that the underlying nature of ruminative optimism
and psychological resiliency is, to some degree, the opposite of maladaptive rumination. In
this way, the BRS optimism scale may be acting as a sort of reverse-indicator for behaviors
that represent maladaptive rumination. To illustrate, a person with a high score in the
BRS optimism scale is likely to think positively about themselves whereas a person with
a greater tendency toward maladaptive rumination is more likely to think negatively about
themselves. Future research is necessary to better understand this relationship as well as
to improve our definitions of maladaptive rumination within the context of psychological
resiliency.
4.2.1 Combining Rumination Measures
Perhaps one of the most intriguing and frustrating aspects of the present research was the
lack of cohesiveness between rumination measures when used together to model relation-
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ships with the other constructs of interest (i.e., creativity and dysphoria). I had assumed
that using multiple indices of rumination would improve my ability to model the relation-
ship between creativity, rumination, and dysphoria. In contrast, model fit was dramatically
reduced with the addition of multiple indicators of rumination to the model.
As discussed earlier, items on the RRS are known to be confounded with symptoms of
dysphoria (Treynor et al., 2003). Thus, including this measure may make it more math-
ematically difficult to identify variance specific to a rumination factor separate from dys-
phoric variance. The RPA scales were likewise difficult to interpret. Specifically, the RPA
adaptivity factor does not correlate with the RRS maladaptive rumination factor, arguably
the standard metric of maladaptive rumination.
Because the literature so far has failed to clearly divide measures of rumination into
two, pure, adaptive/maladaptive factors, trying to assign adaptivity at the level of measure-
ment subscales may currently not be possible. Until measures of rumination are better
understood from this two-factor approach, it is likely necessary to evaluate item adaptive-
ness rather than subscale adaptiveness. Examining the structure of rumination across mea-
sures at the item level may allow researchers to forego the difficulties encountered in the
present dissertation and successfully combine measures of rumination within greater pre-
dictive models. It is worth noting, however, that the BRS subscales fell more naturally into
the two-factor structure, and might therefore be good candidate measures for researchers
interested in investigating relatively pure measures of adaptive and maladaptive rumination.
4.3 Rumination and Depression
Regardless of measure, the non-directional models indicated that the relationship between
dysphoria and maladaptive rumination is both statistically significant and positive. The re-
lationship between adaptive rumination and dysphoria is not statistically significant in the
non-directional model that utilized the BRS as the rumination measure. Because items on
the RRS are known to be confounded with symptoms of dysphoria, it is not surprising that
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the RRS adaptiveness subscale is also correlated with dysphoria. Even with the confound-
ing effect, however, the correlation between adaptive rumination and dysphoria is seventeen
times lower than the correlation between maladaptive rumination and dysphoria. Although
the directionality is unclear in the present study, people with a tendency toward maladap-
tive rumination also have a tendency to feel more dysphoric than people who engage in
adaptive rumination.
4.4 Rumination and Creativity
As discussed earlier, I predicted that adaptive rumination would have a positive impact
on creativity. Regardless of measure, the path between adaptive rumination and creativity
was both significant and positive in the non-directional models whereas the path between
maladaptive rumination was either negative or not statistically significant. Although direc-
tionality is not clear, it seems fair to conclude that adaptive rumination supports creativity
whereas maladaptive rumination impairs creativity.
Moreover, it appears that creativity and dysphoria are linked together solely by the pres-
ence of maladaptive rumination – not adaptive rumination. In the non-directional model
with the RRS, the maladaptive and adaptive factors are correlated, which may account for
the statistically non-significant path between creativity and maladaptive rumination. In
contrast, the maladaptive and adaptive rumination factors were not allowed to correlate in
the non-directional model with the BRS because of the underlying measurement structure
of the BRS. As a result, some of the variance in the BRS maladaptive rumination factor
may be related to creativity, however, this relationship is negative suggesting that creativity
is reduced in people with a greater tendency toward maladaptive rumination.
4.5 Convergent Thinking
I assumed that convergent thinking as measured by the Remote Associates Test (RAT;
Mednick, 1968) would be an important subfactor in the structural model of creativity. Un-
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fortunately, including the RAT as a subfactor of creativity made it difficult to interpret the
meaning of the latent creativity factor. I argue that convergent thinking is still likely an im-
portant factor in the greater understanding, modeling, and prediction of creativity as a latent
factor. That being said, it may be that convergent thinking relates to creativity through the
action of a creative sub-process, such as the frequency of creative output, rather than shar-
ing a direct relationship with a latent, general creativity factor. Further research is needed
to better understand the relationship between convergent thinking and creativity.
4.6 Conclusion
The present study investigated models of rumination, creativity, and dysphoria. Findings
support a two-factor adaptive/maladaptive structure of rumination. Further psychometric
studies are needed to evaluate the viability of existing measures of rumination within this
context. Dysphoria is higher and creativity is lower in people with a tendency toward mal-
adaptive rumination. In contrast, creativity is higher and dysphoria is lower in people with
a tendency toward adaptive rumination. Findings support the hypothesis that rumination






A.1.1 Order of Measures
Measures were provided to participants in the following order:
1. Informed consent
2. Torrance Test of Creative Thinking
3. Purdue Creativity Tests
4. Remote Associates Test (RAT)
5. Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ)
6. Short Scale of Creative Self (SSCS)
7. Broad Rumination Scale (BRS)
8. Responses to Positive Affect (RPA)
9. Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS)
10. Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale Revised (CESDR)
11. Information regarding counseling services for people who may need psychological
assistance
Detailed information for each measure is provided in the following sections.
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A.1.2 CESDR
Specific instructions for the CESDR as folows, ”Below is a list of the ways that you might
have felt or behaved. Please indicate how often you have felt this way in the past WEEK
OR SO”. Response options were listed as: ”Not at all or less than one day”, ”1-2 days”,
”3-4 days”, ”5-7 days”, and ”Nearly every day for two weeks”.
Items for the CESDR were presented in the following order:
1. My appetite was poor.
2. I could not shake off the blues.
3. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
4. I felt depressed.
5. My sleep was restless.
6. I felt sad.
7. I could not get going.
8. Nothing made me happy.
9. I felt like a bad person.
10. I lost interest in my usual activities.
11. I slept much more than usual.
12. I felt like I was moving too slowly.
13. I felt fidgety.
14. I wished I were dead.
15. I wanted to hurt myself.
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16. I was tired all the time.
17. I did not like myself.
18. I lost a lot of weight without trying to.
19. I had a lot of trouble getting to sleep.
20. I could not focus on the important things.
A.1.3 Rumination Measures
Specific instructions for the BRS were as follows, ”Please read each statement and indi-
cate the extent to which it generally applies to you and your thoughts.” Items were fully
randomized in presentation.
Specific instructions for the RPA were as follows, ”People think and do many different
things when they feel happy. Please read each of the following items and indicate whether
you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each one when you feel happy, excited,
or enthused. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do.”
Items were fully randomized in presentation.
Specific instructions for the RRS were as follows, ”People think and do many different
things when they feel depressed. Please read each of the items below and indicate whether
you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost always think or do each one when you feel
down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you
should do.” Items were fully randomized in presentation.
Readers are directed to Appendix C where detailed item information is reported for
each scale.
A.1.4 Torrance Test of Creative Thinking
Participants were first presented with the following instructions, ”This next exercise is
timed. You will have three minutes to complete the task. Please try to keep responding
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for the entire time. When you are ready to begin, click ’Start Timer!’”.
Figure A.1: Image presented to participants taking the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking
Once the timer started, participants were presented with Figure ?? and the following
instructions, ”Just suppose you could walk on air or fly without being in an airplane or
similar vehicle. What problems might this create? Use a period to separate each different
answer”. Answers were typed into a provided text box. Participants were given three
minutes to respond.
A.1.5 Purdue Creativity Test
The Purdue Creativity Test consisted of three parts. Before the beginning of each part,
participants were provided with a break screen that contained the following instructions,
”This next exercise is timed. You will have two minutes to complete the task. Please try to
keep responding for the entire time. When you are ready to begin, click ’Start Timer!’”.
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(a) Part 1 (b) Part 2 (c) Part 3
Figure A.2: figures displayed for each of the three parts of the Purdue test
Upon starting the timer, participants received Image Figure A.2a, Figure A.2b, or Fig-
ure A.2c for the respective part of the Purdue test. Instructions were as follows, ”What is
this? List as many possibilities as you can. Write each answer on a new line.” Answers
were typed into a provided text box. Participants were given two minutes to respond to
each of the three parts.
A.1.6 Creative Achievement Questionnaire
The CAQ is split into three separate parts.
Specific instructions for the first part were as follows, ”Please select the areas in which
you feel you have more talent, ability, or training than the average person. Choose as many
as apply to you”. Participants could select from the following areas: Visual arts (painting,
sculpture), music, dance, individual sports (tennis, golf), team sports, architectural design,
entrepreneurial ventures, creative writing, humor, inventions, scientific inquiry, theater and
film, and/or culinary arts.
For the second part, participants were asked to select the sentences that described them
for each of the following areas: Visual arts (painting, sculpture; Figure Figure ??), music,
dance, architectural design, creative writing, humor, inventions, scientific inquiry, theater
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and film, and the culinary arts. Sentences and values for achievements are detailed in the
Figure Figure A.3 below. Participants were also asked to list any other creative achieve-
ments that were not mentioned in a provided text box.
The third part of the CAQ asked participants to ”select all the sentences below that
apply to you.” Sentences were as follows:
1. One of the first things people mention about me when introducing me to others is my
creative ability in the above areas.
2. People regularly accuse me of having an ”artistic” temperament.
3. People regularly accuse me of being an ”absent-minded professor” type.
Part 1 and Part 3 were not used in the dissertation analyses.
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Figure A.3: Items and values for each area in part two of the CAQ
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A.1.7 Remote Associates Test
Before beginning the RAT, participants were presented with the following instructions:
For this next activity, you will see 30 items consisting of three words each.
Your task is to find a word that connects each word set together in a meaningful
way. Below, we present you with two examples.
(1) ”COTTAGE - SWISS - CAKE” can all be meaningfully connected with the
word ”CHEESE”. (2) ”CREAM - SKATE - WATER” can all be meaningfully
connected with the word ”ICE”
You will have 5 minutes to complete this activity.
Items were presented in the order shown in Table Table A.1. Note that both items and
their associated difficulties were obtained from Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003. Answers
were typed into a provided text field following each item. Participants were given five
minutes to respond.
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Table A.1: Item order and difficulty information for the Remote Associates Test
A.1.8 Short Scale of Creative Self
Participants received the following instructions, ”Below you will find several sentences
used by people to describe themselves. Please decide to what extent each of these state-
ments describes you. There are no good or wrong answers.” Participants responded by
clicking the radial button next to the option that best described themselves. Response op-
tions were as follows: ”Definitely not”, ”Somewhat not”, ”Neither yes nor no”, ”Somewhat
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yes”, ”Definitely yes”.
Items were presented in the following order:
1. I think I am a creative person.
2. My creativity is important for who I am.
3. I know I can efficiently solve even complicated problems.
4. I trust my creative abilities.
5. My imagination and ingenuity distinguishes me from my friends.
6. Many times I have proved that I can cope with difficult situations.
7. Being a creative person is important to me.
8. I am sure I can deal with problems requiring creative thinking.
9. I am good at proposing original solutions to problems.
10. Creativity is an important part of myself.
11. Ingenuity is a characteristic that is important to me.
A.2 Appendix B
Table of factor loadings for a three-factor solution obtained using exploratory factor analy-
sis with an oblimin rotation in R.
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Table A.2: Factor loadings for three-factor solution using exploratory factor analysis on the
rumination measures
In agreement with my originally proposed rumination structure, there was a clear mal-
adaptive factor composed of eight items; it explained 54% of the relative variance (Factor
1; 31% of the total variance). Factor 2 is difficult to interpret but may be thought of as an
optimism or positivity factor consisting of 4 items; it explained 27% of the relative variance
(Factor 1; 15% of the total variance). Factor 3 is difficult to interpret but may be thought of
as a reflection factor consisting of 2 items (both of the BRS and RRS reflection measures);
it explained 19% of the relative variance (Factor 3; 11% of the total variance). It is not clear
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that Factors 2 and 3 are conceptually different; that is, they both appear to be indicators of
adaptive rumination. Factors 1 and 2 were correlated at r = -0.19. Factors 1 and 3 were
correlated at r = 0.13. Factors 2 and 3 were correlated at r = 0.36.
A.3 Appendix C
Confirmatory Factor Analyses at the item level for each subscale tested the structure of
each scale as proposed by the original authors in the literature. Results are reported below.
I first tested the proposed factor structure of the Broad Rumination Scale (BRS) al-
lowing all factors to correlate in a robust confirmatory factor analysis run in EQS version
6.4 on Windows 10. Model fit was adequate (χ2(499) = 1339.17; RMSEA (0.06-0.07)
= 0.06; CFI=0.87; AIC=341.17; CAIC=-2214.95) and the relationship between all items
and their proposed factors were statistically significant. Some of the correlations between
factors (i.e., subscales) were not significant, however, and were set to zero. The model
was retested and final model fit was acceptable and slightly improved (χ2(510) = 1358.27 ;
RMSEA (0.06) = 0.06; CFI=0.87; AIC=338.272; CAIC=-2274.20). The item factor load-
ings are reported in Table Table A.3. The correlations between factors are reported in the
correlation matrix shown in Table Table A.4.
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Table A.3: Item-subscale loadings obtained from the confirmatory factor analysis run on
the Broad Rumination Scale (BRS)
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Table A.4: Subscale correlations obtained from the confirmatory factor analysis run on the
Broad Rumination Scale (BRS)
Next, I tested the proposed factor structure for the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS)
using robust confirmatory factor analysis run on EQS version 6.4 on Windows 10. Model
fit was adequate (χ2(34) = 140.98; RMSEA (0.07, 0.10) = 0.08; CFI=0.93; AIC=72.98;
CAIC=-101.19) and the relationship between all items and their proposed subscales were
statistically significant. The item-subscales loadings are reported in Table A.5. The corre-
lation between the brooding and reflection subscales was significant (r = 0.65, p ¡ 0.05).
Table A.5: Item-subscale loadings obtained from the confirmatory factor analysis run on
the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS)
Finally, I tested the proposed factor structure for the Responses to Positive Affect
(RPA) scale using robust confirmatory factor analysis run on EQS version 6.4 on Windows
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10. Model fit was adequate (χ2(116) = 264.54; RMSEA (0.05, 0.06) = 0.05; CFI=0.94;
AIC=33.54; CAIC=-561.67) and the relationship between all items and their proposed sub-
scales were statistically significant. The item-subscales loadings are reported in Table A.6.
Table A.6: Item-subscale loadings obtained from the confirmatory factor analysis run on
the Responses to Positive Affect Scale (RPA)
The correlation between the Dampening and Emotion-Focus subscales was significant
(r = -0.21, p ¡ 0.05). The correlation between the Dampening and Self-Focus subscales
was significant (r = -0..25, p ¡ 0.05). The correlation between the Emotion-Focus and
Self-Focus subscales was significant (r = 0.88, p ¡ 0.05).
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